Enter quantitative easing. Suppose that, while the riskless overnight rate is constrained to zero, the central bank has some unconventional policy instruments that it can use to reduce interest rate spreads-such as term premiums and/or risk premiums. If flattening the yield curve and/or shrinking risk premiums can boost aggregate demand, then monetary policy is not powerless at the zero lower bound. 6 What might such an arsenal of unconventional weapons contain? While the following list is hypothetical and conceptual, every item on it has a clear counterpart in something the Federal Reserve has actually done.
In that case, a central bank that pursues QE with sufficient vigor can break the potentially vicious downward cycle of deflation, weaker aggregate demand, more deflation, and so on.
First, suppose the objective is to flatten the yield curve, perhaps because long rates have more powerful effects on spending than short rates. There are two main options. One is to utilize "open-mouth policy." The central bank can commit to keeping the overnight rate at or near zero either for, say, "an extended period" (or some such phrase) or until, say, inflation rises above a certain level. To the extent that the (rational) expectations theory of the term structure is valid, and the commitment is credible, doing so should reduce long rates and thereby stimulate demand. 7 The QE approach to the term structure is straightforward: Use otherwise-conventional open-market purchases to acquire longer-term government securities instead of the short-term bills that central banks normally buy. If arbitrage along the yield curve is imperfect, perhaps But this would not normally be considered quantitative easing because no quantity on the central bank's balance sheet is affected. 6 Here I exclude exchange-rate policy from monetary policy. Depreciating the exchange rate may be another option (see Svensson, 2003) , though not when the whole world is in a slump. 7 While the expectations theory of the term structure with rational expectations fails every empirical test (see, for example, Blinder (2004, Chapter 3) ), long rates do seem to move in the right direction, if not by the right amount. because asset-holders have "preferred habitats," then such operations can push long rates down by shrinking term premiums. 8 The second target of QE is risk or liquidity spreads. Every private debt instrument, even bank deposits and AAA bonds, pays a spread over Treasuries for one or both of these reasons. 9 How might a central bank accomplish that? The most obvious approach is to buy any of a wide variety of risky and/or less liquid assets, paying either by selling some Treasuries out of its portfolio, which would change the composition of its balance sheet, or by creating new base money, which would increase the size of its balance sheet.
Since private borrowing, lending, and spending decisions presumably depend on (risky) nonTreasury rates, reducing their spreads over (riskless) Treasuries will reduce the interest rates that matter for actual transactions even if riskless rates are unchanged. 10 Either variant can be said to constitute QE, and its effectiveness depends on the degree of substitutability across the assets being traded. As we know, buying X and selling Y does nothing if X and Y are perfect substitutes.
11 Fortunately, it seems unlikely that, say, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) are perfect substitutes for Treasuries-certainly not in a crisis.
The Fed's entrance strategy
With this conceptual framework in mind, I turn now to what the Federal Reserve actually 8 The preferred habitat theory is due to Modigliani and Sutch (1966) . It is one rationale, for example, for "Operation Twist," which sought to bring down long rates while raising short rates in the early 1960s. Operation Twist, however, was not widely viewed as successful. 9 In practice, it can be difficult to distinguish between spreads due to risk and spreads due to illiquidity. After all, illiquidity is one element of the riskiness of an asset. Hereafter, I will simply refer to risk spreads. 10 Alternatively, if it has the legal authority, the central bank could (partially or totally) guarantee some of the risky assets, or make loans to private parties who agree to buy the assets. 11 Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue that the effectiveness of QE works depends on the existence of "credit market frictions" rather than on imperfect substitutability. I think this difference is mostly terminological. Perhaps more germane to the QE story, the Fed was neither expanding its balance sheet (see Chart 2) nor increasing bank reserves (see Chart 3) much over this period. 14 (Chart 2.) As this was happening, the Fed was acquiring a wide variety of securities that it had not owned before (e.g., commercial paper) and making types of loans that it had not made before (e.g., to nonbanks). On the liabilities side, bank reserves ballooned from about $11 billion to an astounding $594 billion over that same period-and then to $860 billion on the last day of 2008 (Chart 3). Almost all of this expansion signified increased excess reserves, which were a negligible $2 billion in the month before Lehman collapsed (August) but soared to $767 billion by December.
Chart 1 Effective Federal Funds Rate
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13 Taylor (2010) correctly points out that the Fed began expanding its balance sheet substantially even before the Federal funds rate hit zero.
Since the Fed's capital barely changed over this short period, its balance sheet became extremely leveraged in the process.
14 Federal Reserve System balance sheets are published weekly, pertaining to Wednesdays. They are available on the Board's website. 15 These figures are monthly averages.
Specifically, the Fed's leverage (assets divided by capital) soared from about 22:1 to about 53:1.
It was a new world, Tevye.
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The early stages of the quantitative easing policy were extremely ad hoc, reactive, and 
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This change in focus was notable. It was also smart, in my view. As mentioned earlier, riskless rates per se are almost irrelevant to economic activity. The traditional power of the funds rate derives from the fact that risk premiums between it and the (risky) rates that actually matter-rates on business and consumer loans, mortgages, corporate bonds, and so on-do not change much in normal times. Think of the interest rate on instrument j, say R i , as being composed of the corresponding riskless rate, r, plus a risk premium specific to that instrument, lot-in this case rising-the funds rate becomes a weak and unreliable policy instrument.
During the panicky periods, in fact, most of the R i were rising even though r was either constant or falling.
While I will have more to say about the Japanese experience later, one sharp contrast between QE in the U.S. and QE in Japan is worth pointing out right now. The Bank of Japan concentrated its QE on bringing down term premiums, mainly by buying long-term government bonds (JGBs). By contrast, until it started buying long-term Treasuries in March 2009, the Fed's QE efforts concentrated on bringing down risk premiums, which involved a potpourri of marketby-market policies. It was far more complicated, to be sure, but in my view, also far more effective.
In fact, the one aspect of the Fed's QE campaign of which I have been critical is its purchases of Treasury bonds. The problem in many markets was that the sum r + ρ i, was too high--but mainly because of sky-high risk premiums, not high risk-free rates. Thus the real target of opportunity was clearly ρ i , not r, which was already low. Furthermore, a steep yield curve provides profitable opportunities for banks to recapitalize themselves without taxpayer assistance. Why undermine that?
In any case, the Fed's QE attack on interest rate spreads appears to have been successful, at least in part. Charts 4 and 5 display two different interest rate spreads, one short term and the other long term. Chart 4 shows the spread between the interest rates on three-month financial commercial paper and three month Treasury bills; Chart 5 shows the spread between Moody's Baa corporate bonds and ten-year Treasury notes. The diagrams differ in details, with, e.g., short rates much more volatile than long rates. But both convey the same basic message:
Once the Fed embarked on QE in a major way, spreads tumbled dramatically. Admittedly, other things were changing in markets at the same time; so this was hardly a controlled experiment.
Still, the "coincidence" in timing is quite suggestive. 18 Bernanke (2009a Bernanke ( , 2009b Bernanke ( , 2010a Bernanke ( , 2010b Notice that this list deftly omits any mention of raising the federal funds rate. But the funds rate will presumably not wait until all the other steps have been completed. Indeed, Bernanke (2010a) noted that "the federal funds rate could for a time become a less reliable indicator than usual of conditions in short-term money markets," so that instead "it is possible that the Federal Reserve could for a time use the interest rate paid on reserves… as a guide to its policy stance" (p. 10). I will return to this not-so-subtle hint shortly.
The first and third items on this list are the parts of "quantitative tightening" that the Fed gets for free, analogous to letting assets run off naturally. As the Fed has noted repeatedly, its special liquidity facilities were designed to be unattractive in normal times, and Item 1 is by now pretty close to complete. The Fed's two commercial paper facilities (one designed to save the money market mutual funds) outlived their usefulness, saw their usage drop to zero, and were officially closed on February 1, 2010. The same was true of the lending facility for primary dealers, the Term Securities Lending Facility, and the extraordinary swap arrangements with foreign central banks. The TAF and the MBS purchase program were just completed, and the TALF is slated to follow suit at the end of June.
20 Congress authorized the payment of interest on bank reserves as part of its October 2008 emergency package.
Item 2 on this list (raising the discount rate) is necessary in order to supplement Item 1 (making borrowing less attractive), and the Fed began doing so with a surprise inter-meeting announcement on February 18, 2010. A higher discount rate is also needed to enable the Fed to shift to the "corridor" system discussed below.
Note, however, that all these adjustments in liquidity facilities will still leave the Fed's balance sheet with the Bear Stearns and AIG assets and huge volumes of MBS and GSE debt.
Now that new purchases have stopped, the stocks of these two asset classes will gradually sales, just as it does in any tightening cycle. But both the volume and the variety of assets to be sold will probably be huge this time around. Of course, the FOMC will get the usual market and macro signals: movements in asset prices and interest rates, the changing macro outlook, inflation and inflationary expectations, etc. But its decisionmaking will be more difficult, and more consequential than usual, because of the enormous scale of the tightening. If the Fed tightens too quickly, it may stunt or even abort the recovery. If it waits too long, inflation may gather steam. Once the Fed's policy rates get lifted off zero, short-term interest rates will presumably be the Fed's main guidepost once again-more or less as in the past.
This discussion leads naturally to Item 5 on Bernanke's list, the novel plan to offer banks new types of accounts "which are roughly analogous to certificates of deposit" (p. 8). That is, instead of just having a "checking account" at the Fed, banks will be offered the option of buying various "CDs." But here's the wrinkle: Unlike their checking account balances at the Fed, the CDs will not count as official reserves. Thus, when a bank transfers money from its checking account to its saving account, as individuals do all the time, bank reserves will simply vanish.
The potential utility of this new instrument to a central bank wanting to drain reserves is evident. The Fed has announced its intention to auction off fixed volumes of CDs of various maturities, probably ranging from one to six months. Such auctions would give it perfect control over the quantities but leave the corresponding interest rates to be determined by the market. Frankly, I wonder why these new fixed-income instruments would be attractive to banks since they cannot be withdrawn prior to maturity, do not constitute reserves, and cannot serve as clearing balances. In consequence, they may have to bear interest rates higher than those on Treasury bills. We'll see. One view sees all those excess reserves as potential financial kindling that will prove inflationary unless withdrawn from the system as financial conditions normalize. 21 We know that under normal circumstances, and before interest was paid on reserves, banks' demand for excess reserves was virtually zero. But now that reserves earn interest, say at a rate z which the Fed controls, banks probably won't want to reduce their reserves all the way back to zero.
Instead, excess reserves now compete with other very short-term safe assets, such as T-bills, in banks' asset portfolios.
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There is, however, an alternative view that argues that the large apparent "overhang" of excess reserves is nothing to worry about. Specifically, once the relevant market interest rate (r) falls to the level of the interest rate paid on reserves (z), the demand for excess reserves becomes infinitely elastic (horizontal) at the opportunity cost of zero (r-z=0), making the Indeed, one can argue that, for banks, reserves are now almost perfect substitutes for T-bills. So excess reserve holdings won't have to fall all the way back to zero. Rather, the Fed's looming task will be to reduce the supply of excess reserves at the same pace that banks reduce their demands for them. The questions are how fast that will be and how far the process will go. Notice that, as the Fed's liabilities shrink, so must its assets. So as it reduces bank reserves, the Fed must also reduce some of the loans and/or less liquid assets now on its balance sheet. 21 See, for example, Meltzer (2010) and Taylor (2009) . 22 They will soon also complete with the new CDs discussed just above.
effective demand curve DKM rather than DD in Chart 6.
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Chart 6
Another way to state the point is to note that banks will not supply federal funds to the marketplace at any rate below z because they can always earn z by depositing the funds with the Fed.
Interest Rate Floor System
As Chart 6 shows, as long as the (vertical) supply curve of reserves, SS, which the Fed controls, cuts the demand curve in its horizontal segment, KM, the quantity of reserves should have no effect on the market interest rate, which is stuck at z. Therefore, the quantity of reserves should presumably have no effects on anything else, either. Infinitely elastic demand presumably means that any volume of reserves can remain on banks' balance sheets indefinitely without kindling inflation. It also means that the Fed's exit decisions should concentrate on how quickly to shrink the assets side of its balance sheet. The liabilities side, in this view, is the passive partner and matters little per se.
The idea of establishing either an interest rate floor, as depicted in Chart 6, or an interest corridor, as depicted in Chart 7 below, may become the Fed's new operating procedure. The corridor system starts with the floor just explained and adds a ceiling above which the funds 24 Bernanke (2010a, p. 9n) elucidates the corridor idea.
rate cannot go. That ceiling is the Fed's discount rate, d, because no bank will pay more than d to borrow federal funds in the marketplace if it can borrow at rate d from the Fed. 25 The Fed's policymakers can then set the upper and lower bounds of the corridor (d and z) and let the funds rate float--whether freely or managed--between these two limits. Under such a system, the lower bound-the rate paid on reserves, z-could become the Fed's active policy instrument, with the discount rate set mechanically, say, 100 basis points or so higher.
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Chart 7 Interest Rate Corridor System
If the federal funds rate is free to float within the corridor, rather than stuck at the floor or ceiling, the Fed would be able to use it as a valuable information variable. If the funds rate traded up too rapidly, that would indicate the Fed was withdrawing reserves too quickly, creating more scarcity than it wants. If funds traded down too far, that would indicate that reserves were too abundant, that is, the Fed was withdrawing them too slowly. Such information should help the Fed time its exit. 25 Obviously, this requires that discount window lending not be rationed by, e.g., window guidance or limited by "stigma." 26 There is an interesting sidelight here for Fed aficionados: At present, authority to set the discount rate and the rate paid on reserves resides with the Board of Governors, not the FOMC, which sets the funds rate.
Quantitative easing and tightening in Japan
Quantitative easing in Japan, the only relevant historical precursor, began in March 2001 and ended in March 2006. (See Chart 8.) The Bank of Japan (BoJ) drove the overnight interest rate to zero and then pledged to keep it there until deflation ended, mainly by flooding the banking system with excess reserves. To create all those new reserves, the BoJ bought mostly Japanese government bonds (JGBs). As mentioned earlier, the central idea behind QE in Japan was to stimulate the economy by proliferating reserves and flattening the (risk-free) yield curve, not by decreasing risk spreads.
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Chart 8
In fact, long bond rates did fall. But it is difficult to know how much of the decline was due to the BoJ's purchases and how much was due to its pledge to keep short rates near zero for a long while. A survey of empirical research on the effects of Japan's QE programs by Ugai (2006) concluded that the evidence "confirms a clear effect" of the commitment policy on short and 27 There were some purchases of private assets, but the BOJ concentrated on JGBs.
medium-term interest rates but offers only "mixed" evidence that "expansion of the monetary base and altering the composition of the BOJ's balance sheet" had much effect.
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In any case, one of the more interesting and instructive aspects of QE in Japan may be how quickly it was withdrawn. Chart 8 shows that banks' excess reserves climbed gradually from about 5 trillion yen to about 33 trillion yen over the course of about two and a half years, but then fell back to only about 8 trillion yen over just a few months in 2006. Such an abrupt withdrawal of central bank money was, I suppose, driven by fears of incipient inflation, which was curious given Japan's recent deflationary history; in any case, inflation never showed up.
While the suddenness of the BoJ's exit did not kill the economy, whether it damaged the Japanese economy's ability to stage a strong recovery is an open question.
In the case of the Fed, the massive increase in bank reserves after the Lehman bankruptcy came very quickly, as Chart 3 showed. The shrinkage, of course, has yet to begin. But my guess is that it will be gradual. If so, the Fed's pattern (up fast, down slow) will be just the opposite of the BOJ's (up slow, down fast). My second guess is that the Fed's more gradual withdrawal of QE will not unleash strong inflationary forces. And if that is correct, my third guess follows:
History will judge the Fed's course the wiser one. But all this is in the realm of conjecture right now. History will unfold at its own pace.
Implications for central bank independence
Because many of the Fed's unorthodox quantitative easing policies put taxpayer money at risk, these policies constituted quasi-fiscal operations-equivalent to investing government 28 The quotations are from the paper's abstract. funds in risky assets.
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On that last point, it is worth quoting Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act at some length, for it was invoked to justify these actions. It reads:
But there was one big difference: Congress did not appropriate any money for this purpose. Some congressmen and senators are quietly happy that the Fed took these extraordinary actions at its own initiative. After all, doing so saved them from some politically horrific votes. ("Would you please vote $180 billion for AIG, Senator?") But others complain bitterly that the Fed usurped authority that the Constitution reserves for Congress.
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In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, … to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve bank. (emphasis added)
The three bold-faced phrases emphasize the three salient features of this section. First, the circumstances must be extraordinary ("unusual and exigent"). Second, the law allows the Fed to lend to pretty much anyone, without restriction, as long as it takes good collateral. Third, the Fed itself gets to judge whether the collateral is good. In a system of government founded on checks and balances, that constitutes an extraordinary grant of power. But reading the law does at least answer one narrow question: The Fed did not overstep its legal authority; that authority was and is extremely broad.
The real question is whether Section 13(3) grants the central bank too much unbridled power. My tentative answer is yes, especially since 13(3) interventions tend to put taxpayer funds at risk and to be institution-specific-two characteristics that make them inherently political. Still, getting timely congressional votes to address "unusual and exigent" circumstances can be very difficult. Remember, TARP failed on the first vote. Balancing those 29 At the margin, every dollar the Fed losses is the taxpayers' money. 30 Those two steps would go a long way toward filling the democracy deficit.
Another variant of the same question arises when some of the quasi-fiscal operations justified by Section 13(3) are the Fed's monetary policy. Such a situation is, of course, not hypothetical. Since December 2008, the FOMC's undisputed control of the federal funds rate has given it no leverage over the economy whatsoever because the funds rate is constrained to essentially zero, and hence immobilized. Indeed, one might argue that, until just recently, the Fed's most important monetary policy instruments were its asset purchases.
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31 Both bills require the approval of the proposed Financial Stability Oversight Council, which is to be chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. The House bill also requires explicit approval from the Secretary. 32 Probably, this report should be kept confidential for a while, as both bills recognize. 33 Both the House and Senate bills draw sharp distinctions between Section 13(3) lending to specific institutions, which would be prohibited, and more generic Section 13(3) lending aimed at markets, which would be allowed.
Wrapping up
When Your mission, Mr. Bernanke, since you've chosen to accept it, is to steer the Federal Reserve back to planet Earth, using as principal aspects of your exit strategy some new instruments you have never tried before. As always, should you or any member of the Fed fail, the Secretary and Congress will disavow all knowledge of your actions. This lecture will selfdestruct in five seconds. Good luck, Ben.
